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INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITIES: AN ANALYSIS
AND SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE DOCTRINE AND
ITS APPLICATION TO STATE AND MUNICIPAL
BOND INTEREST
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the June 26, 1969, advertisement for the Port of New York
Authority commuter car bonds, general counsel and bond counsel advanced
the opinion that "under the Constitution of the United States of America,
now in force, interest on the bonds . . . is exempt from income taxes

now or hereafter imposed by the United States unless such taxes should
be consented to by the States of New York and New Jersey .. ."I Subsequently, on August 7, 1969, the House of Representatives passed the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, which contained provisions to implement limited
taxation of interest from state and municipal obligations.2 Although these
provisions did not fare well during the bill's consideration by the Senate's
Committee on Finance, and were eliminated from the Tax Reform Act
as enacted,3 the legislative attack upon the statutory exemption granted
to state and municipal bond interest from federal income taxes again raises
the question as to the constitutional immunity of such interest. 4 This
question was last decided by the Supreme Court in 18955 but has not
been directly considered by the Court since that time because of the
statutory exemptions granted such interest in the Revenue Act of 19136
1. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1969, at 61, col. 4-8.
2. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

Except for certain industrial

development bonds and the provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 removing arbitrage bonds, section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides an exemption
for such interest to the obligation holder. It reads:
(a) General Rule - Gross income does not include interest on(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the

District of Columbia.
3. INT. Rev. CODP of 1954, §§ 56, 57, 58; U.S. CODV CONG. & AD.Ngws 115-22
(Dec. 30, 1969). The Act does limit application of the exemption pertaining to state
and municipal bond interest by removing arbitrage bond interest from the purview
of the exemption. INT. Rpv. COD of 1954, § 103; U.S. CODS CONG. & AD. Ngws 207
(Dec. 30, 1969).

4. For a complete list of the numerous legislative attempts to revise the exemp-

tion, see, Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 2200 n.18 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings] ; Foley, Jr., Reciprocal Taxation of the Income From Federal, State and
Municipal Bonds, 6 LVGAL Novas ON LOCAL GvT. 179 n.1 (1941).
5. The Court held federal taxation of interest from municipal bonds to be unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
6. Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81.
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and subsequent revenue acts. The recent modification of this statutory
7
exemption removing certain industrial bond interest from the exemption
as well as the most recent attempt to modify it, suggest that there may
be further attempts to limit the loss of federal revenues resulting from
this exemption by some further modification short of total repeal of
Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.8
In view of this and the fact that bond underwriters may continue
attempts to get guarantees of constitutional protection from bond counsel
to facilitate the sale of state and municipal obligations, the constitutional
question is worthy of renewed examination. This comment will view
generally the broad area of intergovernmental tax immunity from a
functional standpoint and, more specifically, the area of taxation of interest
from governmental obligations.

II.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL

TAX IMMUNITY
Because of the maze created in the area of intergovernmental tax
immunities by a combination of surprising judicial footwork in distinguishing the taxes involved and some inconsistent applications of the principles
evolved in the development of the immunities doctrine, this comment will
not attempt an examination of intergovernmental tax immunity by type
of tax.9 Rather, examination will begin by viewing the fundamental policies
supporting the initiation and expansion of the doctrine and those policies
underlying the present trend in limiting governmental immunity. This will
be followed by a review of the judicial techniques employed over the past
50 years in effectuating the limiting policies.
A.

Policies Underlying Expansion and Limitation of the
Immunities Doctrine

Governmental immunity from taxation by other government units
having concurrent or overlapping tax jurisdiction began with the decision
in McCulloch v. Maryland,10 which held that the State of Maryland could
not constitutionally tax instrumentalities of the United States by placing
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(c).
8. It is estimated that the loss of federal revenues is approximately $2 billion.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 2256, 2258. The political opposition marshalled to defeat
the attempt to modify the effect of the section 103 exemption to the extent that the
wealthy could be required to pay some fair share of the national financial burden
without the availability of a tax shelter in tax-exempt interest suggests that total
repeal of section 103 will not be politically feasible for some time to come.
9. For a comprehensive view of intergovernmental tax immunity with emphasis
on the nature of the tax, see Brown, Intergovernmental Tax Immunity: Do We Need
a Constitutional Amendment, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 153 (1940); Powell, The Remnant
of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. Rsv. 757 (1945); Powell, The
Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1945) ; Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities in the United States, 6 NAT'L TAX J.
305 (1953).
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
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a stamp tax upon the notes of banks chartered by the United States or
require such banks to pay a $15,000 annual tax. Resting on the Supremacy
Clause" for the proposition that the states could not tax instrumentalities
created under federal law which the Constitution declares to be supreme
over state law, Justice Marshall said:
The question is, in truth, a question of supremacy; and if the
right of the states to tax the means employed by the general government be conceded, the declaration that the constitution, and the laws
made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land,
12
is empty and unmeaning declamation.
Because of this early declaration in McCulloch it has been stated
that the primary basis of federal immunity from state taxation is federal
supremacy.'5 However, as the doctrine progressed, federal immunity
was also attributed to the practical necessities of maintaining a dual system
4
of governments with overlapping jurisdictions.1
It was this latter reasoning, based on the notion of dual sovereignties,
that allowed the Supreme Court to extend the doctrine of governmental
tax immunity to the states and their instrumentalities in Collector v. Day.t 5
De-emphasizing the supremacy argument of McCulloch, the Day court
reasoned:
It is conceded in the case of McCulloch v. Md. that the power
of taxation by the States was not abridged by the grant of a similar
power to the Government of the Union; that it was retained by the
States, and that the power is to be concurrently exercised by the
two governments; and also that there is no express constitutional
prohibition upon the States against taxing the means or instrumentalities of the General Government. But, it was held . . . to be pro-

hibited by necessary implication; otherwise, the States might impose
taxation to an extent that would impair, if not wholly defeat, the
operations of the federal authorities when acting in their appropriate
sphere. .

.

. And we shall now proceed to show that, upon the same

construction of that instrument [the Constitution), and for like reasons,
that government is prohibited from taxing the salary of the judicial
officer of a State....
11. Article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides:
(2) This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819).
13. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1928);
Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 468 (1829) ; Gardner, Tax Immune
Bonds, 8 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 1200, 1206-07 (1940) ; Wolf, Indirect Taxation of the
Federal Government: A Questionable Source of Revenue, 6 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rzv.
69, 70 (1965).
14. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936) (dictum) ; Helvering
v. Powers 293 U S. 214, 225 (1934) ; Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 126
(1870) ; Gardner, supra note 13, at 1203-06; Van Cleve, Jr., States' Rights and
Federal Solvency, 1959 Wis. L. Rgv. 190, 192.
15. 78University
U.S. (11 Charles
Wall.)Widger
113 (1870).
Published by Villanova
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The general government, and the States, although both exist within
the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties,
acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. The former, in its appropriate sphere is supreme;
but the States within the limits of their powers not granted, or in the
language of the 10th Amendment, "reserved," are as independent
of the General Government as that government within its sphere
is independent of the States ....

[I] f the means and instrumentalities

employed by [the General Government] to carry into operation the
powers granted to it are, necessarily, and, for the sake of self-preservation, exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the
States depending upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally
exempt from federal taxation? Their unimpaired existence in the
one case is as essential as in the other. .

.

. In both cases the

exemption rests upon necessary [constitutional] implication, and is
upheld by the great law of self-preservation ....
16
Although the Day court reduced the importance of the supremacy
clause as a foundation for federal tax immunity, it is clear that a constitutional basis was ascribed to the dual sovereignty notion and that this
basis applied to both federal and state immunity. During the initial
expansion of the doctrine into the area of state immunity, this reasoning
led to the notion that state immunity was both reciprocal and coextensive
with that enjoyed by the federal government.' 7 However, later decisions
acknowledged the lack of true reciprocity because of the support of federal
immunity derived from the supremacy clause.'
The extension of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
to the states allowed its rapid expansion into areas that eventually caused
the Court to reverse the trend and redirect it toward limitation of
the doctrine. The judicial practice of extending immunity to individuals
directly connected with the exercise of federal powers began with Dobbins
v. The Commissioners of Erie County,19 where it was held that a state
could not tax the income of an officer of the United States. Collector v.
Day,20 provided a reciprocal immunity for state employees. This notion
was later expanded on the basis that it was unconstitutional for one
sovereignty to tax individuals or private interests standing in a close
relationship with the other sovereignty where the tax resulted in an
21
economic burden upon the non-taxing sovereignty.
16. Id. at 123-27.
17. See, e.g., Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1926).
18. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 478 (1939) ; Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412-19 (1938); Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of
Governmental Tax Immunity - A Legal Myth, 3 OKLA. L. Rv. 131 (1950).
19. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
20. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).

21. New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937) ; Panhandle Oil

Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928); Williams v. City of Talladega,

226 U.S. 404 (1912) ; Brown, supra note 9, at 158-59; Rice & Estes, Sales and Use
Taxes as Affected by Federal Governmental Immunity, 9 VAND. L. Rlv. 204, 210
(1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
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Concern over the expansion of the immunities doctrine and the resultant effect upon the tax jurisdictions of the state and federal governments caused the Court to reverse itself and start a trend toward limiting
the doctrine. 22 Interestingly, the basic reasons given for limiting the
doctrine were corollary notions derived from the arguments of dual
sovereignties and the supremacy clause. An example of this reasoning
23
may be seen in Helvering v. Gerhardt,
where it was held that a federal
income tax upon the salary of an employee of a state instrumentality
was constitutional. In Gerhardt, Mr. Justice Stone stated:
[One] reason rests upon the fact that any allowance of a tax immunity
for the protection of state sovereignty is at the expense of the
sovereign power of the nation to tax. Enlargement of the one involves diminution of the other. When enlargement proceeds beyond
the necessity of protecting the state, the burden of the immunity
is thrown upon the national government with benefit only to a
privileged class of taxpayers. With the steady expansion of the
activity of state governments into new fields they have undertaken
the performance of functions not known to the states when the
Constitution was adopted, and have taken over the management of
business enterprises once conducted exclusively by private individuals
subject to the national taxing power. In a complex economic society
tax burdens laid upon those who directly or indirectly have dealings
with the state, tend, to some extent not capable of precise measurement, to be passed on economically and thus to burden the state
government itself. But if every federal tax which is laid on some
new form of state activity, or whose economic burden reaches in
some measure the state or those who serve it, were to be set aside
as an infringement of state sovereignty, it is evident that a restriction
on national power, devised only as a shield to protect the states from
curtailment of the essential operations of government which they
have exercised from the beginning, would become
a ready means for
24
striking down the taxing power of the nation.
Thus, the concept of dual sovereignties was modified by the practical
notion that it contemplates some passing on of economic burdens between
the sovereignties. 25 Although in Gerhardt this modification of the dual
sovereignty concept went only to the limitation on state immunity, the
same reasons were assigned as a basis for the subsequent holding in
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe26 that the salary of an employee
22. This was expressly recognized in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946), when, speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "In the older
cases, the emphasis was on immunity from taxation. The whole tendency of recent
cases reveals a shift in emphasis to that of limitation upon immunity." Id. at 581.
23. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
24. Id. at 416.
25. This was suggested as early as 1926 in Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S.
514, 523-24 (1926), and would overrule the notion suggested by such early cases as
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895), and Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870), that where governmental tax immunity rests
on the dual sovereignty doctrine, any burden, however slight, upon the sovereign will
invalidate the tax.
26. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
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of a federal instrumentality is constitutionally subject to a state income tax.
Although the dual sovereignty argument was the means of limiting
federal immunity in O'Keefe, that decision also provided the basis for
the later use of the supremacy clause as a limitation on federal tax
immunity when it was stated:
[S]uch differences as there may be between the implied tax immunity
of a state and the corresponding immunity of the national government and its instrumentalities may be traced to the fact that the
national government is one of delegated powers, in the exercise of
which it is supreme. Whatever scope this may give to the national
government to claim immunity from state taxation of all instrumentalities which it may constitutionally create, and whatever authority
Congress may possess as incidental to the exercise of its delegated
powers to grant or withhold immunity from state taxation,
Congress
27
has not sought in this case to exercise such power.
Later decisions extended the congressional authority under the supremacy
clause to insulate federal instrumentalities and their transactions from
state tax jurisdictions even though such instrumentalities or transactions
would, in the absence of congressional action, be beyond the permissible
28
scope of judicially granted immunities.
Combining the federal legislative power to insulate its instrumentalities
and the transactions of those instrumentalities with Congress' failure to
do so, the Court has used the supremacy clause as a basis for implying
consent to taxation for the purpose of limiting the application of tax
immunity where a state tax results in only an economic burden being
placed upon the federal government. 29 This is applied even though the
burden may be direct and substantial. 80 It should be noted that there is
no corresponding judicial principle for limiting state immunity that is
analogous to, or as a corollary of, this supremacy limitation of federal
immunity.
Two additional rationales underlying the judicial limitation of the
immunities doctrine suggested in Gerhardt were: (1) movement by the
states into competitive business enterprise and (2) use of the immunities
primarily to benefit private interests. 81 As was seen in Gerhardt, these
considerations fall within the framework of the dual sovereignty limitation
rather than the supremacy reasoning. 32 However, as the pressure to
limit the immunities doctrine increased, these reasons often assumed
27. Id. at 485.
28. United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 51 (1964); United States v. City of

Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474-75 (1958) ; City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S.

329, 333 (1945) ; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 196 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; Rakestraw, supra note 18, at 168. Cf. Carson v. Roane-

Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).

29. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1937).

See United

States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 187-92 (1944). Cf. Penn Dairies, Inc.
v. Milk Control Comm., 318 U.S. 261, 269 (1943).
30. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
31. See p. 418 supra.
32. Id.
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independent significance and were not necessarily cast as an integral part
of a dual sovereignty argument. 83
When the issue has been the application of constitutional immunity
to a state business enterprise, the Court has denied immunity from federal
taxation on the basis that such immunity does not extend to business
activities conducted by the state for gain. 4 By reasoning beyond the
concern for the diminution of federal tax jurisdiction which primarily
underlies the business enterprise rationale, the Court has advanced the
notion that constitutional immunities should not be used to place the state
at a competitive advantage over private enterprise when it chooses to
operate in the normal business sphere. s5
When the primary benefits of constitutional tax immunity inure to
private interests because of their close relationship to the state, the Court
has denied such private interests the immunity shield, stating that "no
implied constitutional immunity can rest on . . . merely hypothetical

interferences with governmental functions." 3 6 In addition to a policy that
such derivative immunities should not be the principal benefit of an implied
constitutional immunity intended to protect only the sovereignty, there
is another strong consideration in limiting the extension of constitutional
immunity to private interests. That is, such private interests should not
receive shelter from the exempt sovereignty because it allows them to
avoid contributing their share of the financial support to the taxing
sovereignty whose benefits and privileges they enjoy.37
The four policies which support the trend toward limiting the application of the immunities doctrine - i.e., dual sovereignty, supremacy, state
business enterprise, and derivative immunity - have been effectuated
by various judicial techniques. The following section will examine these
techniques, using an analysis of the legal incidence in the imposition of
state and federal taxes as a focal point. Since the legal incidence of a tax
determines the question of what or who is legally subject to the tax, such
an analysis provides a good beginning point. However, it should be noted
that often the Court can avoid this stage of analysis and proceed directly
in the application of the limiting policies. 38
33. See, e.g., United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233, 251 (1965)
Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411, 419-20 (1949).
34. Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sytsem of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938);
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) ; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.
437 (1905).
35. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 421 (1938); Rakestraw, supra
note 18, at 153-59.
36. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949). The trend
is for the Court to reject constitutional immunization from nondiscriminatory taxes
on private parties doing business with the government. United States v. City of
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474 (1958).
37. See United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233, 251 (1964) ; United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474 (1958). Cf. Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 483 (1939) ; Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 421 (1938).
38. See, e.g., Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966)
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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B.

Judicial Techniques in Limiting Intergovernmental
Tax Immunity

1.

The Legal Incidence Test

As the dual sovereignties rationale developed into a limiting device
in the application of constitutional tax immunities, one of the elements of
the rationale - i.e., the principle that some passing of the economic burdens
of taxation between the sovereignties is constitutionally permissible required the Court to examine more closely the nature of each particular
tax. It was no longer sufficient to end the analysis with a finding that the
tax in some way burdened the immune sovereign. Rather, it became
necessary to determine whether a sovereignty, its property or transactions,
was actually being taxed. If the incidence of the tax in question was not
upon the sovereignty, but only resulting in the eventual placing of an
economic burden upon the sovereignty, different considerations were applicable. This led to the necessity of distinguishing between the legal
effect of a tax and its economic results on the sovereign. As a result, the
legal incidence test, which distinguishes between the object of taxation and
the measure or ultimate source of payment, 9 evolved.
The first aspect of the legal incidence test - the determination of
whether a tax immune subject is merely the measure of a tax applied
to some other subject - developed early in the present limiting trend.
An example may be seen where estate and inheritance taxes require
40
immune federal or state bonds to be included within the taxable estate.
Here the actual subject of taxation is the transfer of property with the
immune property operating as a convenient measure for the imposition
of the tax. 41 The legal incidence of such a tax is not upon a sovereignty
merely because an immune object is the means used to measure the tax
42
imposed on a transfer.
39. Powell, supra note 9, at 657, 763; Rice & Estes, supra note 21, at 213-15;
Rollman, Recent Developments Respecting the Sovereign Immunity of the Federal
Government from State and Local Taxes, 3 U.S. AIR FORCZ J.A.G. BULL. 10, 11
(1961); Van Cleve, supra note 14, at 194. See Pierce, Tax Immunity Should Not
Mean Tax Inequity, 1959 Wis. L. Rzv. 173, 185-86.
40. Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384 (1922) (municipal bonds); Plummer v.
Coler, 178 U.S. 115 (1900) (federal bonds); Ratchford, supra note 9, at 313.
41. The distinction between the subject of taxation and the measure of the tax
was first enunciated during the expansion of the immunities doctrine and was not
considered a limiting device. Rather, it was a means of insuring the proper application
of the doctrine to situations where the tax could be said to be burdensome to a
sovereign. In the instance of an estate tax on the transfer of property, the fact that
governmental bonds are included in the gross estate as a means of measuring the
transfer tax does not directly burden the issuing sovereign nor does it indirectly
impose a burden by removing the sovereign's competitive advantage.
42. It has been suggested that if the subject of taxation is permissible under the
immunities doctrine, then the measure of the tax need not comply with the doctrine.
Ratchford, supra note 9, at 313. Such an approach ignores the problems that may
arise from indirect economic burdens which may flow from taxation of various transactions. The distinction between the measure and the subject of taxation should be
retained only for the limited purpose of determining the legal incidence of a tax.
Cf., contra, United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) (taxation
of the leasehold interest).
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The more significant aspect of the legal incidence test - distinguishing
between the subject of taxation and the ultimate source of payment was employed by the Court prior to the actual enunciation of such a test.
Thus the Court has found that a state tax upon the gross receipts of a
federal contractor was not a tax upon the federal government 3 and that
a federal income tax imposed upon the salary of an employee of a
state instrumentality was not "in form or substance a tax upon" the
44
instrumentality.
The distinction between subject of taxation and source of payment
became more formalized in Alabama v. King & Boozer,45 where the Court
upheld a state sales tax as applied to a government contractor doing work
under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract which directly passed the economic
burden of the tax to the federal government. Although the tax was upon
retail sales and the seller was denominated as the taxpayer, the statute
imposed upon such sellers the duty to collect the tax from the purchaser,46
thus making the purchaser statutorily liable to the seller for the amount
of the tax.47 The King & Bdozer court interpreted the statutory term
"purchaser of tangible goods" to mean "the person who orders and
pays
for them when the sale is for cash or who is legally obligated to pay for
them if the sale is on credit."'48 By viewing the contractual relationship
between the federal government and the contractor,4 9 the Court found
against the argument pressed by the United States as intervenor that
the legal incidence of the tax was on the federal government, stating: "We
cannot say that the contractors were not, or that the Government was,
bound to pay the purchase price, or that the contractors were not the
purchasers on whom the statute lays the tax." 50
Use of the legal incidence approach in King & Boozer required both
an analysis of the legal application of the tax statute as indicated on its
face and an analysis of its application as affected by the relationship
between those statutorily liable and the immune sovereignty. An example
of the use of these considerations, with emphasis upon the effect of the tax
statute, may be seen in the subsequent case of United States v. Allegheny
County,"' where an ad valorum property tax was imposed by Pennsylvania
upon the property of the Mesta Machine Company. Included in the
assessment was a substantial amount of machinery owned by the federal
43. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 149 (1937).
44. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939).
45. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).

46. Id. at 7.

47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Under the contract, title to goods purchased passed to the government upon
delivery.
50. 314 U.S. at 14. For similar treatment of a state use tax as applied to a
federal government contractor under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, see Curry v.
United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
51. 322 U.S. 174 (1944). Some commentators have suggested that this case
developed the legal incidence test. Rollman, supra note 39, at 11; Van Cleve, supra
note 14, University
at 194. Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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government and leased to Mesta. Interpreting a statutory provision that
the taxes were to be a lien upon the property as being applicable to only
the real estate, with the value of the lien increased by the tax upon
machinery, the Pennsylvania supreme court found that the tax as imposed
fell upon real estate alone.5 2 The United States Supreme Court, on the
other hand, found the legal incidence of the tax to be upon property
owned by the federal government, and answered the argument of the
Pennsylvania supreme court by stating:
[R] enunciation of any lien on Government property itself, which
could not be sustained in any event, hardly establishes that it is not
being taxed. The fact is that the lien on the underlying land is
increased because of and in proportion to the assessment of the
machinery. If the tax is collected by selling the land out from under
the machinery, the effect on its usefulness to the Government would
be almost as disastrous as to sell the machinery itself. The coercion
of payment from compelling the Government to move its property
and interrupt production at the Mesta plant would defeat the purpose
of the Government in owning it and leasing it.... [T]he Government's
5
property interests are not taxable either to it or its bailee. 3
An example of the legal incidence analysis where the emphasis was
placed upon the application of a tax as affected by the relationship between the party statutorily liable and the immune sovereignty may be
seen in Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock.5 4 Here, contractors'constructing
a naval base were brought within the cloak of intergovernmental tax
immunity with respect to an Arkansas sales tax collectible from purchasers
when the provision in their contract dealing with purchases of material
provided that "the contractor shall act as the purchasing agent of the
government in effecting such procurement and the government shall be
directly liable to the vendors for the purchase price."55 Comparing the
Kern-Limerick contract with that in Alabama v. King & Boozer,56 the
Court stated that "the contract here in issue differs in form but not in
economic effect on the United States. The nation bears the burden of
the Arkansas tax as it did that of Alabama. 5 7 However, the Court found
"that the purchaser under this contract was the United States. Thus,
52. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 187 (1944). Concerning
the interpretation of state tax statutes as they affect the federal government, the
Court stated:
Where a federal right is concerned we are not bound by the characterization
given to a state tax by state courts or Legislatures, or relieved by it from the
duty of considering the real nature of the tax and its effect upon the federal
right asserted.
Id. at 184 citing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
53. Id. at 187. The Court does indicate that a tax limited to the bailee's leasehold
interest would be allowed. This would bring into play the distinction between the
subject of and the measure of the tax. Id. at 186--87. See United States v. City of
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
54. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
55. Id. at 112 n.2.
56. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
57. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 119 (1954).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
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King & Boozer is not controlling for, though the government also bore
the economic burden of the state tax in that case, the legal incidence of
that tax was held to fall on the independent contractor and not upon the
United States." 8
After it is determined whether the legal incidence of a tax falls
upon a governmental unit or its instrumentalities, different results will
obtain upon application of the immunities doctrine depending upon whether
it is the federal government or a state or municipal governmental unit
that is affected by the tax, and whether such effect is the imposition of the
legal incidence of the tax or represents a passing of economic burden.
2.

Legal Incidence Upon Federal G,dvernment

If the legal incidence of a state or municipal tax is upon the property
or transactions of the federal government or its instrumentalities, such
a tax will be found unconstitutional. 9 This result may be supported by
either the supremacy or the dual sovereignty arguments. For a state to
have the original power to tax the federal government, these arguments,
which are fundamental to the immunities doctrine, must be overcome.
Since both the supremacy and dual sovereignty concepts are grounded
in the Constitution,60 it is difficult to conceive of any judicial expansion
of the limiting rationales derived from either the same constitutional
concepts 6 ' or those embodying practical considerations 62 as being sufficient
to overcome the basic immunities doctrine. However, this is not to say
that the Court is totally unable to limit the application of the immunities
doctrine where it is argued that the legal incidence of a state or municipal
tax falls upon an instrumentality of the federal government.
58. Id. at 122 (emphasis added). Although Kern-Limerick appears to place
federal agency officials in a position to draw constitutional lines restricting state
and municipal tax jurisdictions as to persons dealing with the agency merely by the
drafting of the contract, prerequisite to such action is a delegation of Congressional
authority. See Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 115-17 (1954). Moreover, it must be clear that the relationship between the contractor and the government is intended to expose the government to the incidence of the tax. Upholding a
local doing-business tax, the Court, in United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355
U.S. 484 (1958), stated:
Constitutional immunity from state taxation does not rest on such insubstantial
formalities as whether the party using government property is formally designated
a "lessee." Otherwise immunity could be conferred by the draftsman's pen. The
vital thing .

.

. is that .

.

. (the contractor) was using the property in connection

with its own commercial activities. The case might be different if . . . (the
contractor) could properly be called a "servant" of the United States in
agency terms.
Id. at 486.
59. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) ; Mayo v. United
States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943) (inspection fee). This formalistic approach provides an
easy answer to the question of immunity and allows the Court to avoid the policy
questions that would be necessary otherwise. A recent case that provides a good
example is First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339,
347 (1968).
60. See pp. 416-17 supra.
61. See pp. 416-18 supra.
62. See pp. 419-20 supra.
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Some limitation of the doctrine may be effected by applying what
may be termed a "constitutional instrumentality test" which examines
whether an agent of the United States is to be considered an instrumentality
under the constitutional tax shield. 68 The policy underlying limitation
by this technique is to avoid placing private interests in the position of
a primary beneficiary of the constitutional immunity.0 4 Thus, the dominant
considerations in applying this test focus on the closeness of the relationship
between the claimed instrumentality and governmental activities. 65
3.

Legal Incidence Upon The State

Although the rationale and principles of a constitutional instrumentality
test are applicable to determine whether the agents of, or those connected
with, a state or municipal corporation are protected by the immunities
doctrine, 66 this approach has not been a principal limiting device where
the immunity runs to the state. A primary technique in judicial limitation
of state immunity from federal taxation is to determine whether the
particular property or transaction subject to taxation should be included
within the constitutional protection. This determination employs what
63. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1966).
See United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486-87 (1958).

64. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949) (state gross
production and excise tax upon lessee of federal mineral rights upheld). See First
Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1968) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
65. Reviewing the applicable elements in the determination of this relationship,
Justice Marshall said:
As the Court said last Term, "there is no simple test for ascertaining whether
an institution is so closely related to governmental activity as to become a taximmune instrumentality." Various formulations of the controlling test have been
used to determine whether institutions or individuals are immune: whether they
"have been so incorporated into the government structure as to become instrumentalities of the United States and thus enjoy governmental immunity ;" whether
they "are arms of the government deemed by it essential for the performance of
governmental functions," and "are integral parts of [a government department
and] .

.

. share in fulfilling the duties entrusted to it;" whether they have been

so "assimilated by the Government as to become one of its constituent parts ;"
and whether the institution is regarded "virtually as an arm of the Government."
Under those general rubrics, the Court has looked to various specific factors
and characteristics to determine the status of the specific institution: whether it
is organized for private profit, and whether the Government has retained such
control over it so that "it could properly be called a 'servant' of the United
States in agency terms ;" whether it was organized to effectuate a specific governmental program; whether its ownership, substantially or totally, lies in the
Government; whether government of officials handle and control its operations;
whether its officers or any significant portion of them are appointed by the Government; whether the Government gives it significant financial aid, whether it is
charged by law with carrying out some of the Government's international commitments, and whether it performs "functions indispensable to the workings" of
a governmental unit.
First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339. 353-54 (1968)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). For Congressional silence regarding the immunity of an
instrumentality as a consideration, see Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943)
Powell, supra note 9, at 771.
66. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926). See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) ; Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S.
362, 369 (1938). Cf. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576 (1946) ; Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
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may be termed the governmental-proprietary test, which encompasses a
distinction between the proprietary activities of a state or municipal
corporation and essential governmental transactions or property, with the
latter falling within the constitutional immunity. 67 While such a test is
analogous to the constitutional instrumentality test, the policies effectuated
by it are different. These policies are: (1) the dual sovereignty limitation
that state business activities should not diminish the federal tax jurisdiction where such activity would be taxable if conducted by private
enterprise ;68 and (2) the argument that the state may not use constitutional
immunity to place business activity conducted for gain at a competitive
advantage over private enterprise. 69
Because of the policies underlying the use of the governmentalproprietary test as a limiting device, the important factor in the test is
to view the taxable activity or property in light of its relationship to
the usual sphere of private business activity, disregarding the fact that
70
the activity or property may be impressed with a governmental function.
This is most clearly expressed in Allen v. Regents of the University System
of Georgia,71 where the Supreme Court, upholding a federal tax imposed
upon admission charges collected by a state educational institution at its
athletic exhibitions, stated:
When a State embarks in a business which would normally be taxable,
the fact that in so doing it is exercising a governmental power does
not render the activity immune from federal taxation. . . The important fact is that the State, in order to raise funds for public
purposes, has embarked in a business having the incidents of similar
enterprises usually prosecuted for private gain. If it be conceded that
the education of its prospective citizens is an essential governmental
function of Georgia . . . it does not follow that if the State elects

to provide the funds for any of these purposes by conducting a
business, the application of the avails in aid of necessary governmental
functions withdraws the business from the field of federal taxation.
. . . [H]owever essential the system of public education to the
existence of the State, the conduct of exhibitions for admissions paid
by the public is not such a function of state government as to be free
from the burden of a non-discriminatory tax laid on all admissions.
. . . Moreover, the immunity implied from the dual sovereignty
67. Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938) ;
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). This test is not applicable
when the question is of federal immunity from state or municipal taxation. Since
federal powers are derived by constitutional delegation as opposed to the reservation
of powers in the states, there is no latitude for the federal government to engage in
business activities conducted for gain. Consequently, all federal activities will be
deemed governmental in nature. Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314
U.S. 95, 102 (1941) ; Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939) ;
Rakestraw, supra note 18, at 162. Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934).
68. See p. 418 & note 34 supra. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946).
69. See Rakestraw, supra note 18, at 153-59.
70. See Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911) ; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905).
71. 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
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recognized by the Constitution does
72 not extend to business enterprises
conducted by the States for gain.
Practical application of a governmental-proprietary test has been
somewhat clouded by the opinion in New York v. United States,78 where
the Supreme Court upheld a federal excise tax imposed on the sale of
natural or artificial mineral waters. The State of New York which
bottled and sold the natural mineral waters from the state reservoir
through the Saratoga Springs Authority, claimed immunity from the tax
on the basis that it was engaged in the exercise of a traditional and
essential governmental function. 74 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the Court, rejected the reasoning of Allen and stated:
To rest the federal taxing power on what is "normally" conducted
by a private enterprise in contradiction to the "usual" governmental
functions is too shifting a basis for determining constitutional power
and too entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal
criterion. The essential nature of the problem cannot be hidden by
an attempt
to separate manifestations of indivisible governmental
75
powers.
For a standard as to what activities of the state could be subjected to
federal taxation, it was posited that "so long as Congress generally . ..
[taxes] the source of revenue by whomsoever earned and [such a source
is] not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution
of the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls
also on a State." 76 As examples of a state activity or property that would
partake of uniqueness sufficient to bring it within the governmental
immunity, it was suggested that "[o]nly a State can own a State house;
only a State can get income by taxing. These could not be included for
purposes of federal taxation in any abstract category of taxpayers without
77
taxing the State as a State."
The approach of Justice Frankfurter reduces any governmentalproprietary distinction to a test of whether the incidence of a federal tax
operates to discriminate against the property or transactions of a state.
72. Id. at 451-53. In Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), decided the

same day, the Court enunciated the following principle concerning governmentalproprietary distinctions:
[One] principle of limitation for holding the tax immunity of state instrumentalities to its proper function .... dependent upon the nature of the function being
performed by the state or in its behalf, excludes from the immunity activities
thought not to be essential to the preservation of state governments even though
the tax be collected from the state treasury.
Id. at 419.
This statement is broader, and capable of more limiting application than the
language of the Allen Court. However, the Gerhardt limiting principle is dictum
while the language of the Allen Court was used to resolve the case on its facts.

73. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).

74. The governmental function claimed was the disposition of natural resources.

Id. at 580-81.
75. Id. at 580.
76. Id. at 582.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
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The reasoning employed by Justice Frankfurter appears to minimize the
effectiveness of a constitutional immunity implied from a notion of dual
sovereignties where the activities of each sovereign within its appropriate
sphere of authority are to be unimpaired by the other sovereign's
taxation. The operative limiting factor is the practical consideration that
the states may not diminish the tax jurisdiction of the federal government
by the expansion of state activities into areas of private enterprise.
Justice Frankfurter's dictum 78 would extend this practical argument to

a rule that would allow direct federal taxation of many legitimate state
activities with the constitutional immunity providing a narrow exception
only for such state activity or property that is unique to the state. To
the extent that the limitation of governmental tax immunity stemming
from the concept of dual sovereignties concerns the inappropriateness of
enlargement of the tax immunity of one sovereignty to the diminution
of the tax jurisdiction of the other and therein evinces some suggestion
that the limitations should, to a degree, be reciprocal, it seems that Justice
Frankfurter went too far. If there is to be any reciprocity in the dual
sovereignty limitation, then the effect of the supremacy doctrine in
immunizing the federal government and its instrumentalities from the
incidence of state taxation must be considered when evaluating the appropriate scope of state immunity.
Although the New York opinion clouds application of proprietarygovernmental type reasoning as a limitation of tax immunity, it must
be observed that the cloudiness goes only to its application in borderline
cases. The emphasis is on further limitation of the immunities doctrine
by allowing federal taxation of areas of activity that may have escaped
taxation if a clear proprietary distinction were required. Thus, the governmental-proprietary distinction is of pragmatic value in initially assessing
the application of the immunities doctrine to state and municipal activities
and will resolve the constitutional question in many instances.
The preceding techniques of limiting the immunities doctrine, although
principally used when the legal incidence of a tax falls on the governmental unit, may be applied as well where the incidence of the tax falls
elsewhere but results in an economic burden upon the government. 79
78. Clearly the Court could have arrived at the same result on the basis of the
governmental-proprietary distinction. Justice Frankfurter's rejection of this distinction and his use of the non-discriminatory approach represents the position of only
two of the eight justices deciding the case. Four justices concurring in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Stone stated:
[W]e would find it difficult not to sustain the tax in this case, even though we
regard as untenable the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary"
interests on which those cases rest to some extent. But we are not prepared to
say that the national government may constitutionally lay a non-discriminatory
tax on every class of property and activities of States and individuals alike.
Id. at 586.
79. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934). See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
U.S. 405 (1938); Brush v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 352 (1937) (overruled by Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, on the issue of immunity of employee
salaries). Cf. Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949).
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However, for the most part, different considerations prevail where the
tax affects the government only as an economic burden.
4.

Economic Burden Upon The Federal Government

Once it is established that the legal incidence of a state or municipal
tax does not fall upon the federal government, then the immunities doctrine
will not render the tax unconstitutional merely because it results in an
economic burden upon the federal government or its instrumentalities.8"
There are two policies underlying this limitation of federal immunity: (1)
The notion that under a system of dual sovereignties some economic tax
burden is constitutionally permissible;81 and (2) the power of Congress
under the supremacy clause to withdraw transactions or property from
state tax jurisdictions that would not have been within the scope of the
judicially granted tax immunity.8 2 The latter reasoning allows the Court
to hinge the issue of federal tax immunity on the legalistic basis of whether
or not the incidence of the tax falls upon the federal government, removing
economic considerations as to the nature and extent of burdens resulting
from the tax.83

Thus, whether the burden is in the nature of increased

federal expenditure to offset the tax or the ultimate payment of the tax,
84
it need not be evaluated in terms of detrimental effect.
There is one exception to this broad limitation of the immunities
doctrine as applied to federal immunity - the states or municipalities
may not structure a tax so that the economic burden of ultimate payment
is discriminatorily placed upon the United States.85 Thus, before a state
or municipal tax may escape the immunities doctrine, its economic burden
must fall both on private interests and the federal government equally.8 6
Similarly, such taxes may not be structured or administered in such a
manner as to discriminate against those with whom the federal government
87
deals.
80. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 494 (1958) ; United States v.
City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 472 (1958); Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14
(1941) ; Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) ; Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937);

Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) ; Powell, supra note 9, at 758.

81. See p. 418 & note 25 supra.
82. See p. 419 & note 28 supra.
83. There has been some doubt expressed by the Court as to its right and ability
to go beyond a legalistic application of the immunity to indulge in such considerations
as the nature and extent of economic burden necessary to trigger immunity. See New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 581-82 (1946).
84. See, e.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) (ultimate payment);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (increased expenses).
85. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958) ; Ratchford, supra
note 9, at 324.
86. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473-74 (1958).
87. Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 387
(1960) ; United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958) ; Rollman, supra
note 39, at 14-15.
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Eoonomic Burden Upon State Or Municipal Government

When the legal incidence of federal taxation falls upon those persons
with whom the state or municipality deals and results in an economic
burden on such governmental units, the governmental-proprietary and
discrimination tests are applicable.8 8 Thus, where the economic burden
falls upon state activities having the incidents of a normal business
enterprise, no protection will be afforded by the immunities doctrine 9
unless the tax has been structured or applied discriminatorily." °
When the tax results in an economic burden upon an essential state
or local function and that function is not denied immunity by reason of
the governmental-proprietary test, the question of whether the immunity
doctrine provides relief depends upon the directness of the burden and
the benefits obtained by relief from such a burden. These considerations,
as enunciated in Helvering v. Gerhardt,91 form what may be denominated
a benefit-burden test:
[W]here the tax laid upon individuals affects the state only as the
burden is passed on to it by the taxpayer . . . the immunity [does

not apply] when the burden on the state is so speculative and uncertain that if allowed it would restrict the federal taxing power
without affording any corresponding tangible protection to the state
government; even though the function be thought important enough
to demand immunity from a tax upon the state itself, it is not
necessarily protected from a tax which well may be substantially
92
or entirely absorbed by private persons.
In Gerhardt, the tax challenged was a federal income tax which the
national government had collected from the employees of a state instrumentality. Thus, the economic burden upon the state with which the
Court was concerned was in the nature of increased operating expenses
rather than a direct passing of the taxpayers' economic burden as in a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. Relying heavily on the uncertainty of the
increase in expense to the state from the federal income tax,9 3 the
decision turned on the rationale that some passing of economic burdens
is a necessary incident of concurrent tax jurisdictions and therefore
94
constitutionally permissible.
88. See note 79 supra.
89. See note 72 supra.

90. See Ratchford, supra note 9, at 324-25. Rollman, supra note 39, at 14-15.
91. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
92. Id. at 419-20.

93. Id. at 421. The Court took the position that to some extent the economic

burden was unmeasurable.
94. Id. at 422-24. Also underlying the decision is the assumption that the burden

would be substantially borne by the individual taxpayer. In view of this, the Court

was reluctant to relieve such individuals from their duty to support the federal government whose benefits and privileges they enjoy. Id. at 420-21. In Wilmette Park Dist.
v Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949), when considering the effect upon an instrumentality
of the state of a federal tax imposed upon admissions, the Court stated:
It is true, of course, that unless there is a shift in demand for admissions to
petitioner's
beach,
imposition
the tax
mayDigital
to anRepository,
undeterminable
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In considering the benefit to the state - reduced operating expenses from tax immunity in this instance, the Court measured it against the
economic burden which would be placed on the state if immunity were
not allowed, 95 with the key to such a balancing found in the Court's
statement that the tax "does not curtail any of those functions which have
been thought hitherto to be essential to their continued existence as states."96
Thus, to come within the immunity doctrine the benefit of tax immunity
will have to result in protection of the continued existence of the state
qua state. 97 The notion that an unconstitutional tax would have to
"curtail" such a benefit was modified later in the Gerhardt opinion to
include, as unconstitutional, burdens that threaten "unreasonably to obstruct
any function essential to the continued existence of the state government."98
To restate the considerations of the benefit-burden test, it must be
determined if the operation of the economic burden upon the state is so
uncertain that application of the immunity doctrine would deny federal
tax revenues without giving any corresponding tangible protection to the
state. Where it is likely that private citizens will substantially absorb
the economic burden of the tax there is sufficient uncertainty to deny the
immunity. Before the corresponding tangible protection required to be
afforded the state will comply with the requirements of the immunity
doctrine, it will be necessary to show that the state function sought to be
protected is essential to the continued existence of the state. The standard
by which the effect of the tax is measured is whether the economic impact
unreasonably threatens to obstruct any essential state function.
affect the volume of admissions. Insofar as this occurs, the services of the District
will be less widely available and its revenues from beach admissions will be
reduced. But admissions tax, which is 'paid by the person paying for such
admission,' is so imposed as to facilitate absorption by patrons of the beach rather
than by the District, and we have no evidence that the District will be forced
to absorb the tax in order to maintain the volume of its revenues and the availability of its benefits.

Id. at 420.
95. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 420-21 (1938).
96. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
97. It may be noted that the language incorporating the concept of essential
governmental function into the benefit-burden test is framed in terms that would
comport with the language in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580-82
(1946), and is broader than that in Allen v. Regents of the Univ. System of Georgia,
304 U.S. 439, 451-53 (1938). This suggests that once it is found that sufficient
burden does reach the state, then the range of functions that will be deemed essential
governmental functions is narrower than the scope of state activities that will be
protected by the governmental-proprietary distinction of the Allen Court. This aspect
of the benefit-burden test may be cast as dictum since the Gerhardt Court resolved
the case on the basis of insufficient burden and did not reach the question of essential
governmental function.
It has been suggested that the Port Authority is not such a function essential
to the continued existence of the state that would comply with the immunity doctrine.
Powell, supra note 9, at 644. However, it would seem that any governmental function
which would qualify under the standard of the Allen Court should suffice. The only
basis for distinguishing the benefit-burden test and requiring more stringent standards
for the governmental activity which will trigger immunity is that this test comes into
play only when there is an economic burden upon the state and the legal incidence of
the federal tax falls elsewhere, whereas the governmental-proprietary distinction of the
Allen Court is used where the legal incidence of federal taxation falls upon the state.
98. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938) (emphasis added).
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OF INTEREST FROM STATE OR

MUNICIPAL OBLIGATIONS

The preceding discussion has reviewed the rationales and techniques
of the Supreme Court in dealing with the general area of intergovernmental
tax immunity. These must be kept in mind when viewing the Court's
treatment of the doctrine as it applies to federal taxation of interest from
state or municipal obligations. Also, the principles must be applied consistently with the trend toward limitation of the doctrine providing a
framework for their application.
Viewing the chronological progression of the doctrine as it applies
to interest from governmental obligations, attention will be focused initially
upon Weston v. City Council,99 where the issue was whether a city could
impose a personal property tax upon governmental obligations of the
United States held by its residents. Finding a contract executed in
exercise of the governmental power to borrow money to be "an operation
essential to the important objects for which the government was created," 100
the Court held the tax unconstitutional under the supremacy rationale of
McCulloch.101 Concerning the operation of the tax as it affected the
United States, the Court stated:
The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made, must
operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and have
a sensible influence on the contract. The extent of this influence
depends on the will of a distinct government; to any extent, however
inconsiderable, it is a burden on the operations of government. It
may be carried to an extent which shall arrest them entirely.
The tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a
tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the
credit of the United States .... 102
Although Weston concerned local taxation of federal securities, the
Court subsequently recognized the reciprocal immunity of obligations of
state or municipal governments from federal taxation.10 3 Once it was
established that the holder of governmental obligations may not be subjected to taxation on the basis of his property interest, the next question
was whether the income received by the holder from such obligations was
similarly immune. This was answered by the Supreme Court in Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 10 4 where it was held that the interest from
municipal bonds was not constitutionally subject to federal taxation. To
99. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
100. Id. at 467.
101. Id. at 467-69.

102. Id.

103. Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U.S. 138, 162 (1887) (dictum).

104. 157 U.S.429 (1895).
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support this holding, the Pollock court quoted the preceding passage from
Weston v. City Council, and stated further:
[T]he same want of power to tax the property or revenues of the
States or their instrumentalities exists in relation to a tax on the
income from their securities ....

[I]t is obvious that taxation on the

interest therefrom would operate on the power to borrow before it
is exercised, and would have a sensible influence on the contract,
and that the tax in question is a tax on the power of the States
and their instrumentalities10 5 to borrow money, and consequently repugnant to the Constitution.
Since both the Weston and Pollock cases were decided during the
expansion phase of the immunities doctrine, when any burden on a
governmental unit was sufficient to invalidate a tax, it was not material
whether the exact nature of the burden was an increased expense for
the issuing governmental unit or whether it represented a direct passing
of the taxpayers' burden to the government. However, clearly in both
instances the burden is the indirect economic effect of increased expenses
for the issuer if it is to retain the capacity to borrow money as freely
in a competitive market as before such taxes. Unfortunately, the language
of the Pollock court, and the lack of any necessity to analyze the nature
of the burden imposed by taxation of income from governmental obligations, combined to foster the notion that such taxation was economically
a tax upon the governmental unit. This reasoning will be traced through
the following review of the application of the immunities doctrine to
taxation of interest from governmental obligations.
Following Pollock, the Court began to limit the expansion of the
immunities doctrine in the area of governmental obligations. For example,
in 1900 the Court upheld a state inheritance tax imposed upon a legacy of
United States bonds. 10 6 Similarly, ten years later a federal tax on corporate net income over $5,000 received by a corporation from all sources including interest from municipal and state bonds - was upheld as a tax
upon the doing of corporate business. 107 In both cases, the inclusion of
governmental obligations or the interest therefrom in the tax base served
as a convenient measure for the taxation of some other transaction i.e., the transfer of property or the doing of corporate business.
Subsequently, in 1927, taking the position that "directly to tax the
income from securities amounts to taxation of the securities themselves,' u08
105. Id. at 585-86.

106. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115 (1900). Five years later, in Hibernia Savings
Soc'y v. San Francisco, 200 U.S. 310 (1906), the Court upheld a state personal
property tax levied on checks or warrants issued by the United States Treasury and
payable any time within four months, on the basis that such a tax did not interfere
with governmental functions.
107. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 144-46 (1911). For an earlier case
upholding a state doing-business tax measured by dividends upon capital stock where
large amounts of capital were invested in federal bonds, see Home Ins. Co. v. New
York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890).
108. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 521 (1928).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
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the Court, in National Life Insurance Co. v. United States,10 9 invalidated
provisions of a federal tax on life insurance companies which taxed the
interest, dividends, and rents received less deductions for (1) interest
received from tax-exempt securities, and (2) a sum equal to 4% of
the company's legal reserves diminished by the amount of any tax-exempt
interest. The tax had the effect of imposing a greater burden upon taxable
property merely because the taxpayer owned tax-exempt government
securities. This application of the immunities doctrine to interest from
government securities was broadened two years later in Missouri v.
Gehner,"0 where similar provisions in a state tax were invalidated. The
Gehner court stated that where:
ownership of United States bonds is made the basis of denying the
full exemption which is accorded to those who own no such bonds this
amounts to an infringement of the guaranteed freedom from taxation.
It is clear that the value of appellant's government bonds was not
disregarded in making up the estimate of taxable net values."'
This position represents the notion that a taxing authority cannot compensate for revenues lost because of immune government bonds by placing
corresponding burdens, which operate as an indirect tax on immune income,
upon the other areas subject to tax. However, in neither National Life
nor Gehner was the Court required to question the basic constitutional
status of interest from governmental obligations under the immunity
doctrine. Thus, these cases do not represent any solidifying of the basic
doctrine of tax immunity, but rather represent an application of the
doctrine assuming its validity as to such interest based on the notion that
a tax on interest is economically a tax on the source.
In 1930, the Court in Willcuts v. Bunn" 2 found that gains derived
from trading in municipal bonds were constitutionally taxable by the federal
government. Distinguishing the situation of a tax upon profits gained
through trading in municipal bonds from that of a tax upon interest
received, the Court affirmed its earlier position in the Pollock case
by stating:
But it does not follow, because a tax on the interest payable on
state and municipal bonds is a tax on the bonds and therefore forbidden, that the Congress cannot impose a non-discriminatory excise
tax upon the profits derived from the sale of such bonds. The sale
of the bonds by their owners, after they have been issued by the State
or municipality, is a transaction distinct from the contracts made
by the government in the bonds themselves, and the profits on such
sales are in a different 3category of income from that of the interest
payable on the bonds."
109. 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
110. 281 U.S. 313 (1930).
111. Id. at 321-22,
112. 282 U.S. 216 (1931).

113. University
Id. at 227.
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As a general limiting standard in applying the immunities doctrine to
the question of gains derived from trading in immune bonds, the Court
posited: "Before the power of Congress to lay the excise tax in question
can be denied in the view that it imposes a burden upon the States'
borrowing power, it must appear that the burden is real, not imaginary;
substantial, not negligible. 1 1 4 Thus, the nature of the burden from taxing
such gains was subjected to analysis and found constitutionally permissible.
The surprising factor in the Willcuts case is the Court's willingness
to indulge in an analysis of the nature of the burden of a tax as a limiting
device in applying the immunities doctrine to the gains situation, while
mechanicallv reciting the notion that "a tax on the interest payable on
state and municipal bonds is a tax on the bonds"" 5 as representative of
the doctrine's application to a federal tax upon bond interest. It is
submitted that the apparently inconsistent approaches merely represent
the Court's desire to leave completely open the question of the immunity
of municipal bond interest until presented with the problem. This can be
supported by the observation that when the Court in 1939 stated that
"[t]he theory, which once won qualified approval, that a tax on income
is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable,"" 6 the
Court had already shifted its characterization of the operation of a tax
upon bond interest in terms of the immunities doctrine to:
That doctrine recognizes the direct effect of a tax which 'would
operate on the power to borrow before it is exercised' and which
would directly
affect the Government's obligation as a continuing
7
security.' 1
Thus, although commentators hailed the 1939 statement as the basis for
the future demise of the immunities doctrine as applied to interest from
governmental obligations," 8 the question was still open. However, now
it was framed in terms of the effect of the tax on the governmental unit
and consequently would not be subject to easy analysis and resolution
by the emergence of the legal incidence test.
Another 19 30's case, Denman v. Slayton,n 9 shows the Court moving
toward limitation of the doctrine as it applies to taxation on municipal
bond interest. Here, the Court upheld a provision in the Internal Revenue
Code120 disallowing as a deduction interest on indebtedness incurred or
continued in purchasing or carrying obligations which are tax exempt.
The Court found that the manifest purpose of the disallowance was to
114. Id. at 234.
115. Id. at 227.
116. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939).
117. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 153 (1937) (cited case
omitted). See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 385-87 (1938).
118. E.g., Foley, Jr., supra note 3, at 185; Wenchel, Federal-State Reciprocal
Taxation of Income from Public Securities, 17 TAXts 507, 552-54 (1939).
119. 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
120. Revenue Act of 1921, Title II, § 214(a) (2), 42 Stat. 238-39, presently, INT.
RWv. COD4 of 1954, § 265.
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prevent the escape from taxation of income properly subject thereto by
the purchase of exempt securities with borrowed money and that this
1
did not result in defeating any constitutionally guaranteed exemption. 21
Further, the burden resulting from the disallowance of a deduction for
interest incurred in the purchase of exempt securities was found constitutionally permissible.

122

Subsequently in 1965, commenting on the Denman case, the Court
in United States v. Atlas Insurance Co. 123 stated: "We affirm the principle
announced in Denman . . . that the tax laws may require tax-exempt

income to pay its way."' 124 In Atlas Insurance, provisions in the Life
Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959125 allocated prorata the
tax-exempt interest to policy reserves with the result that the taxable
income of insurance companies was greater than if all of the tax-exempt
interest had been allocated to the company's share of income. Holding
that the tax burden thus imposed was permissible, the Court said:
In the last analysis Atlas' insistence on both the full reserve and
exempt-income exclusions is tantamount to saying that those who
purchase exempt securities instead of taxable ones are constitutionally entitled to reduce their tax liability and to pay less tax per
taxable dollar than those owning no such securities. The doctrine
of intergovernmental immunity does not require such benefit to be
conferred on the ownership of municipal bonds. Congress was entitled
to allocate investment income to policyholders as it did. The formula
'was designed to subject all to payment of their just share of a
burden fairly imposed .... 12,
Again, although neither the Denman nor the Atlas Insurance court
analyzed the constitutionality of the basic application of the immunity
doctrine to interest from governmental obligations, there does emerge
from these cases a concern over the availability of constitutional tax
immunities to individuals who use them for shelter in escaping payment
of their share of the national financial burden. This attitude may prove
particularly significant should Congress challenge application of the
immunities doctrine to state and municipal bond interest with tax provisions similar to the proposed measures in the Tax Reform Act as originally passed by the House of Representatives.
121. Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1931).
122. It must be noted that in Denman the Court ignored the implications of the
earlier case of Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930), to the effect that
a taxpayer could not be required to pay a greater tax because of his ownership of
exempt securities than if the exempt securities were disregarded in computing the tax.
123. 381 U.S. 233 (1965).
124. Id. at 247.
125. INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 804.
126.
United Charles
States Widger
v. AtlasSchool
Ins. Co.,
381Digital
U.S. 233,
251 (1964).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

After having considered the policies and techniques of the Court in
the application of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, although
the final analysis will necessarily remain speculative, it may be fruitful
to apply these considerations to actual and possible federal legislative
action bringing interest from state and municipal obligations within the
federal tax jurisdiction. Viewing the constitutional question of immunity
in general terms, it must be noted that any immunity for such interest
would flow not from the supremacy clause since that rationale applies only
to federal immunity but rather from the dual sovereignty concept which
contemplates some passing of tax burdens between the sovereignties. In
all instances of federal income taxation of such interest, the legal incidence
of the tax is not upon the issuing government or instrumentality; rather,
the legal incidence is upon the individual holder who receives the interest.
Moreover, the economic burden that the issuing governmental units may
bear as a result of such taxation is not a direct passing of the tax cost
from the obligation holder to the issuer but rather represents increased
expenses necessarily incurred if the issuer is to retain its former borrowing capacity in the competitive market. Whether this effect is termed
direct or indirect, it is to some degree speculative and incapable of precise
measurement because the interest paid by the issuer and the offering price
1 27
of the obligations are dependent upon the mechanisms of the marketplace.
Thus the constitutional question of immunity is reduced to one concerning
the nature of interference posed by such taxation and the benefits to be
28
derived by the affected sovereignty from the immunity.
Considering initially the present tax structure, Section 103 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that the exemption afforded
interest from state and municipal obligations does not apply to certain
industrial revenue bonds.' 2 9 Here the immunity issue is resolved on the
12. On December 3, 1969, it was reported that the City of Philadelphia had
received no bids for the issuance of $64.2 million in general obligation bonds because
the 7.5 percent interest rate was too low. The asking rate was said to be 8 percent.
Phila. Inquirer, Dec. 3, 1969, at 1, col. 2. In contrast, the interest offered on similar
obligations in 1965 generally did not exceed 4.5 percent. MooDY'S, MUNICIPAL AND
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1937 (1966).
When interest rates of offered obligations are lower than the current market
rate the obligations can be sold by lowering the offering price at which they can be
obtained. This serves to adjust the yield to investors to a more competitive level yield is comprised of an interest component and a capital gains component. Staats,
The Municipal Bond Market and Tight Money,
DELPHIA Bus. Rv. 6 (June 1968).

FEDERAL

RiSfRV

BANK OF

PHILA-

128. See pp. 430-31 supra.
129. IN'. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(c), provides in pertinent part:
(1) Subsection (a) (1) not to apply. - Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, any industrial development bond shall be treated as an obligation not described in subsection (a) (1).
(2) Industrial development bond. - For purposes of this subsection, the term
"industrial development bond" means any obligation(A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of proceeds of which are to be used directly or indirectly in any trade
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
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nature of the interference by such taxation. Assuming arguendo that
sufficient interference with the governmental borrowing power in the
area of industrial redevelopment financing could be shown, 130 and that
the question of instrumentality is not at issue,13 ' the fact that government
borrowing may be considered an activity essential to the continued existence
of the government unit will not alone bring the interest within the immunity
doctrine. As has been seen, the governmental function - borrowing for
a public purpose - must be viewed as coupled with the specific activity
to which it relates. 13 2 In this instance, the activity is as a landlord or
vendor of industrial properties. As a landlord or vendor of industrial
property, the governmental unit has moved into the arena of ordinary
business activity and as such its activities would not come within the
constitutional shield. 13 3 Thus, the essential governmental function borrowing - involved in financing such activity is no longer immune
from federal taxation. 3 4 Moreover, the transaction one step removed i.e., receipt of interest by the obligation holder - is also outside the
scope of immunity. 33
In addition to industrial revenue bonds, Section 601 of the Revenue
Act of 1969 has revoked the exemption for interest from certain arbitrage
or business carried on by any person who is not an exempt
person (within the meaning of paragraph (3)), and
(B) the payment of the principal or interest on which (under the

terms of such obligation or any underlying arrangement) is, in
whole or in major part-

(i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used

in a trade or business or in payments in respect of
such property, or
(ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property,
or borrowed money, used or to be used in a trade or
business.
130. It has been argued that the loss of the exemption for interest from industrial
development bonds will sharply curtail this means of financing economic progress by
most of the municipalities which used this means of finance in the past. Robinson,
Industrial Development Bonds: They're Not What They Used To Be, ESDSRAL
RESERV BANK oF PHILADELPHIA Bus. Rxv. 7-8 (Mar. 1969).
131. The position of the Treasury Department in advocating the removal of the
exemption for industrial development bonds was that such governmental units established for the purpose of their issuance were not obligations of instrumentalities within the meaning of the statute since the primary obligation of the indebtedness,
according to the underlying arrangement between the governmental unit and the
benefiting industry, is upon the industry and thus the obligation represented by such
bonds is that of the private industry. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7, 33 Fed. Reg.
4950 (1968).
132. See p. 426 supra.
133. Id.
134. See pp. 426-28 supra. But see McCollom, Industrial Development Bonds and
Tax Policy: A Trend Toward Vivisection of Public Finance, 23 TAx LAWYZR 383,
397 (1970).
135. However, it may be argued that the benefit-burden and instrumentality tests
should be applied first, see Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949);
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Hearings, supra note 4, at 2199 n.16.
The nature of the potential constitutional defect in affording immunity to industrial
revenue bond interest arising from the activity involved allows the problem to be
settled on a legalistic basis in a manner consistent with the present limiting trend
in the immunities doctrine and avoids difficult policy judgments that the Court may
be reluctant to make. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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bonds issued by state and municipal governmental units. 1 36 Arbitrage bonds
may be broadly described as bonds issued when the proceeds are expected to be used for investment purposes by the purchase of other bonds
or securities to produce a yield for the issuer higher than that expected
by holders of the issuer's bonds.1 7 The reasoning which was applicable
to the industrial development bond exception will similarly deny constitutional immunity to the interest from arbitrage bonds. Here the issuer
has used borrowing power to move into the business area of investment
for profit and is in a position analogous to that of the investment banker.
138
Thus, the governmental-proprietary test would deny immunity.
Although it would presently seem unlikely that across-the-board taxation of state and municipal bond interest will be imposed by Congress,
attempts to bring this potential source of revenue within federal tax
jurisdiction have occurred in the past"

9

and will probably occur in the

future. The more pronounced the difference between the savings by state
and municipal governments and the loss of federal revenues resulting from
the Section 103 exemption of such interest, the better the chance of future
reform. This differential is currently estimated to be approximately $1
billion, with the federal tax loss estimated at $2 billion and the savings
to the states estimated at $1 billion. 140 Before limited reform such as
that contained in the proposed House bill141 is considered, it will be
helpful to consider the immunity question in terms of a complete repeal
1 42
of the Section 103 exemption.
136. Title VI of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 601. Arbitrage Bonds.
(a) Not To Be Treated As Tax-Exempt Obligations. - Section 103
(relating to interest on certain governmental obligations) is amended
by redesignating subsection (d) as (e), and by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection:
(d) Arbitrage Bonds.(1) Subsection (a) (1) Not to apply. - Except as provided in
this subsection, any arbitrage bond shall be treated as an
obligation not described in subsection (a) (1).
(2) Arbitrage Bond. - For purposes of this subsection, the term
"arbitrage bond" means any obligation which is issued as part
of an issue all or a major portion of the proceeds of which
are reasonably expected to be used directly or indirectly(A) to acquire securities (within the meaning of section
165(g) (2) (A) or (B)) or obligations (other than
obligations described in subsection (a) (1)) which
may be reasonably expected at the time of issuance
of such issue, to produce a yield over the term of
the issue which is materially higher (taking into
account any discount or premium) than the yield on
obligations of such issue, or
(B) to replace funds which were used directly or indirectly to acquire securities or obligations described in subparagraph (A).
137. See Id.
138. See pp. 426-28 supra. It is also doubtful that the benefit of protecting such an
investment business by the issuer could be argued in good faith as being essential to
the continued existence of the issuer.
139. See note 4, supra.
140. Hearings,supra note 4, at 2256-58.
141. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
142. The most direct impact of any modification of the statutory exemption would
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
arise in the instance of complete repeal of Section 103.
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The critical consideration in terms of constitutional immunity should
Section 103 be repealed would be the nature of the interference under
the benefit-burden test. Here the criteria for such an examination requires
a determination of whether the economic burden is so uncertain - i.e., it is
likely that the burden will be substantially absorbed by private citizens that the immunity of such interest would restrict the federal tax jurisdiction
without giving any corresponding tangible protection to the state. 143 The
protection afforded to the state must benefit a function essential to the
continued existence of the state.14 4 The standard by which an interference is measured is whether it unreasonably threatens to obstruct the
145
essential function.
Assuming that the power to borrow will be coupled with an essential
state function and that the status of instrumentality is not in question,
consideration of whether the burden upon an issuer of governmental
obligations in terms of increased interest or other costs will be uncertain
should be viewed in the context of other factors already affecting such
costs. Initially, it must be observed that continuing inflation and the
resulting tight money situation have forced municipal and state bond
interest far in excess of its customary rates.146 Additional factors are
presented in the investor's concern with the risks attending investment in
such bonds. Negative effects may result from: (1) the publicizing of the
urban crisis; (2) the possible inability of municipalities to raise substantial
amounts of new revenue by taxation during a "taxpayers' revolt"; and
(3) the lack of investor confidence in the politicians in control of the
municipalities. 147 Such factors would seem to create some degree of uncertainty in the establishment of the interest level to be paid by the
issuer of state or municipal bonds.
Assuming the loss of the tax exemption, the nature of the distribution 48 of ownership of tax-exempt bonds alone creates some uncertainty
as to the burden that would fall upon the issuer. A substantial amount
of such bonds is held by owners not subject to federal income taxation. 1 49
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See p. 430 supra.
See p. 431 supra.
Id.
See note 127 supra.
Staats, Taking Aim at Tax-Exempts, FtDSRAL RuS8RVIt BANK O PHILADtLPHIA Bus. RmV. 8 (Sept. 1969).
148. The estimated distribution of outstanding securities issued by state and local
governments, territories and possessions is as follows:
SECURITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, TERRITORIES
AND POSSESSIONS OUTSTANDING JUNE 30
(IN BILLIONS)

-Held by Private Non-Bank
Total
Held by
Held by
Indiv. Insur. Mutual Corps.
Amount CommerU.S. Got.
Cos.
Savings
Outcial
Investment
Banks
standing
Banks
Accounts
1965
99.2
36.6
.8
36.0
15.2
.4
3.3
1966
104.8
40.3
.9
38.2
14.4
.3
4.1
1967
113.3
45.6
1.0
39.8
15.5
.3
4.8
Published by Villanova
University
Charles
Widger
School
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Law
Digital
Repository,
1970
1967 SEC'Y
OF THE TREAS. ANN. REP. 647.
Date

149. Id.

Investors
State,
Misc.
Local
& Terr.
Gets.
5.8
1.9
4.6
2.0
4.2
2.1
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Further, commercial banks, who hold the largest portion of the outstanding
tax-exempts, will desire to be in a position to continue sharing in the
$15 billion in demand deposits which state and local governments place
in the nation's banks. Thus, there will be some competitive pressure
between the banks to hold such governmental obligations regardless of
the tax exemption. 15° Moreover, the banks are limited by regulation in
the channeling of their investment funds, and governmental obligations
have generally been considered to represent a sound investment. Also,
the insurance companies, who are substantial holders of tax-exempt
obligations, in striving for sound investments will find the tax liability
attenuated because part of the income may be allocated to policy reserves. 15
On the other hand, private investors, 152 absent increased interest by the
issuer, it may be assumed, will move their investment funds to other
areas, thereby avoiding absorption of the tax as imposed on this form
of income.

53

Clearly, there is uncertainty as to the extent of the economic burden
from taxation of interest that will have to be absorbed by the issuer.
However, it has been long agreed that some increase in interest levels
will result. 154 This must be viewed in context of the dual sovereignty
concept that some passing of economic burden is constitutionally permissible. Even if the relative certainty that the individual investor would
require higher interest rates to remain in the market were sufficient to
satisfy the question of speculativeness under the benefit-burden test in
favor of granting immunity, it still would have to be shown that the
economic burden of the increased costs would unreasonably threaten to
150. See Staats, supra note 147, at 8. In 1967, the commercial banks held $45.6
billion of the $113.3 billion in such securities outstanding.
151. INT. Rev. COD4 of 1954, § 804(a).
152. In 1967, private investors held $39.8 billion of the outstanding governmental
securities. See note 148 supra.
153. The breakdown of individual holdings by income is:
1962 Income (Dollars)

Per Cent (Appro.r.)

0 3,000 5,000 -

2,999
4,909
7,499

*

-

9,999
14,999
24,999
49,999
99,999

1

7,500
10,000
15,000
25,000
50,000

100,000 and over
*

*
*

*

2
7
24

67

Less than one-half of 1 per cent.

Staats, supra note 147, at 4. The yield of tax-exempts is approximately 30 percent
less than corporate bonds of comparable quality. Thus, as the investor exceeds the 30
percent tax bracket, the tax savings from purchasing tax-exempts increases. Therefore, the high-tax-bracket individuals will be more likely to look for more profitable
yields once the exemption is repealed. See Staats, supra note 147, at 4-7.
154. Staats, supra note 147, at 9; Hearings, supra note 4, at 2257-58, 2281; Foley,
supra note 4, at 182. If inflationary pressures have forced the interest rates to a point
far in excess of traditional rates, it may be difficult to argue that an additional 1
or 1.2 percent attributable to the loss of the exemption will unreasonably threaten to
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/5
obstruct the borrowing power.
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obstruct the power of the issuer to borrow. Another factor militating
against immunity is the fact that the persons who will primarily benefit
from immunity are the individuals in the high income brackets, for
whom the exemption provides a tax-shelter allowing them to avoid their
155
share of the national financial burden.
In view of the uncertainty attached to the economic burden upon
the issuer of governmental obligations, it is submitted that the policies
limiting the scope of constitutional tax immunity will prevail should the
Section 103 exemption be repealed and such Congressional action be
tested in court. Although the application of the benefit-burden test leaves
the court much leeway, it would take a substantial fiscal argument to
overcome the pressure toward limitation of the immunities doctrine.
Having arrived at the position that any constitutional immunity
claimed in the face of a repeal of the Section 103 exemption is at best
doubtful, it is further submitted that when the burdens upon the issuer
are attenuated by only partial taxation of interest from state and municipal
obligations there would seem to be little basis for a claim of immunity.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 as originally passed by the House, the
Section 103 exemption was limited as to individuals by means of the
disallowed tax preferences. 156 The amount of such interest that would be
included in gross income was lumped together with other disallowed tax
preferences, such as the capital gains deduction and accelerated depreciation "5 7 thus limiting some of the alternatives by which the individual
could avoid imposition of the full measure of income taxation. Moreover,
as enacted, the Tax Reform Act only imposes as a minimum tax on the
tax preference items a 10% rate on the sum of such preference items
in excess of $30,000, and which is greater than the taxes that would be
imposed without regard to the minimum tax. 158
Had the Section 103 preference item not been deleted from the final
Act, the effect upon the issuer resulting from such taxation could be
nothing other than speculative. Moreover, with the other tax shelters
similarly limited it would seem as likely as not that the burden would
be substantially absorbed by the affected individual. It is submitted that
such modification of the Section 103 exemption and similar limited
modifications partially exposing interest from state and municipal obligations to the federal tax jurisdiction will be able to marshall little force
in an argument for constitutional immunity.
Leonard C. Homer
155. See p. 436 & note 94 supra. It is sometimes argued that high-income taxpayers
are financially supporting the issuing governmental unit by an implied tax of 30 percent
when purchasing governmental obligations which pay 30 percent less interest. This
represents savings to the issuer and has the same effect as if the issuer could tax the
interest. See Staats, supra note 147.
156. H.R. 13270, §§ 301-02, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
157. H.R. 13270, § 301, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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